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These days the rich are very rich indeed. Increasingly, they also seem to be 
more or less in charge. They negotiate directly with our elected officials 
about government policies; they own the media companies that set the 
agenda for our national political conversations; they cultivate private rela-
tionships with political candidates dependent on their financial support; 
they fund ‘grass-roots’ political movements; they even run as political 
candidates themselves. They are hailed not only as the ‘job-creators’ of 
our economy, but also, in their guise as philanthropists, as our saviours: of 
our public services, such as education (Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg); our 
politics (the Michael Bloombergs and Silvio Berlusconis); the discipline of 
economics (George Soros); and so on. George Clooney even has his own 
spy satellite pointed at Sudan (the Satellite Sentinel Project). The rich 
have become public figures with the status of celebrities and ‘thought 
leaders’ whose lavish lifestyles, minor life-events and superficial opinions 
on the matters of the day are considered of great public significance.  
I think there is something very wrong with this situation. In fact I think it 
may be a crisis, in the technical sense of a stage in a sequence of events at 
which the trend of all future events is determined, for better or for worse. 
My concern is well summarised by a famous quotation from the US su-
preme court justice Louis Brandeis, whose career spanned a previous gild-
ed age. 
We must make our choice. We may have democracy, or we may have 
wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can't have both. (Dil-
liard 1941, 42)1.  
This essay tries to clarify the nature of the crisis and how it may be ad-
dressed by examining the character of the rich and the character of de-
mocracy. The rich have two defining capabilities: independence from and com-
mand over others. Those two features make being rich very pleasant indeed. 
But they are also what make the rich bad for democracy, and indeed even 
for capitalism. Democracies are extended moral communities whose 
flourishing, and also mere survival, depend on the general interdepend-
ence and approximate equality of their members. The rich do not only 
have no place in this kind of community, their very presence undermines 
it.  
This essay is not about social justice. Perhaps it is morally wrong that 
some people are rich and others are poor, and perhaps it would be moral-
ly right to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor, and even from 
wealthy countries to poorer countries, but from this perspective that de-
bate is a distraction. What I'm concerned with here is the sinking ship - 
the threat the rich pose to democracy itself – not the proper 
(re)arrangement of deck chairs between first and third-class passengers. 
Hence my modest proposal: if we believe our democracy is worth preserv-
ing, we should offer the rich a choice: give up your money or give up your citizen-
ship. 
 
A Political Not a Moral Problem 
The normative definition of the rich is always those who have ‘too much’. 
Yet there are various ways of defining this in the contemporary literature 
on social justice. Some, egalitarians such as John Rawls (Rawls 1999), take 
the equal distribution of wealth as the starting point for thinking about 
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social justice: inequality is illegitimate unless specifically morally justified. 
Others criticise the legitimacy of the processes by which the present con-
centrations of wealth in our society arose (including even libertarians, 
when they take Robert Nozick’s historical account of entitlement serious-
ly2). Yet others focus on the inefficiency of great inequality. The utilitarian 
Peter Singer (2009), for example, argues that ordinary middle-class people 
in the west have much more than enough (anyone with annual income 
over $35,000 is in the global 1%) while a great many (around 2 billion) live 
in appalling absolute poverty. The richer you are, the less benefit you will 
derive from having one more dollar to spend because all your most im-
portant needs and wants have already been satisfied; for the same reason, 
the poorer you are the more good that same dollar could do for you. So 
the relatively rich should give away our money to the poorest people we 
can find, where it will do the most good. And we should keep giving up to 
the point that we have to sacrifice something of comparable moral signifi-
cance (which seems pretty far). 
These various approaches to thinking about justice problematise wealth 
in different ways (unfairness, illegitimacy, inefficiency). Although I won't 
be making direct use of any of them, it is worth noting what they all have 
in common: identifying the problem of the rich as 'absolutely relative'. In 
other words, the rich pose an objective problem of justice not because of 
how wealthy they are in absolute terms (how much they can buy) but 
because of the problematic relation in which they stand to others. I employ 
the same foundational idea - just as seawater is good for fish but poisonous 
to humans, so extreme wealth is wonderful for individuals but poisonous to 
democracy. However, my approach is different from that of the justice theo-
rists because I focus on the political problem of wealth and not its moral 
problems. So I am not directly concerned with identifying injustices in the 
distribution of wealth, nor with making its distribution more just, for ex-
ample by making the rich give their money (back) to the poor. My reasons 
for focusing on the political dimension rather than the moral are two-
fold. 
First, it seems to me that a threat to democracy has a more existential 
character and thus possesses an urgency that issues of social injustice lack. 
In particular, while the relationship between social injustice and concen-
trations of wealth seems relatively linear (on most accounts), the relation-
ship between democracy and individual wealth may include a threshold 
above which a dramatic failure of democracy becomes very likely. If our 
society makes mistakes about justice, we can hope to remedy them later. 
If we make mistakes with our democracy, we may not get a second 
chance. 
Second, there is a strategic advantage to politicising wealth-holding rather 
than moralising its distribution. People with very different moral views 
can appreciate the importance of democracy, and of saving democracy, 
precisely because of the scope for pluralism and public reasoning about 
justice that democracy permits. It seems to me that many people who dis-
agree about exactly how wealth should be distributed in society—including 
those with egalitarian, libertarian, or utilitarian moral intuitions—can 
nevertheless come together to condemn extremes of wealth that threaten 
a polity’s capacity to debate justice at all.  
 
The Bourgeois Character of Democracy 
Democracy as we know it is the invention of the American republic, and, 
as Alexis de Tocqueville analysed, is fundamentally government by and 
for the middle-classes, the bourgeoisie. Indeed, the flourishing democratic 
societies of the world are all politically dominated by a middle class; as the 
political scientist Barrington Moore famously put it, "No bourgeoisie, no 
democracy". This may not be a feature of many philosophical accounts of 
democracy, but it is a fact about modern liberal democracies, the only 
ones that seem to work. For example, the mere possession of formal dem-
ocratic institutions like parliaments and elections is demonstrably insuffi-
cient for the successful practice of democracy, as poor countries such as 
India demonstrate.3  
Successful democracies are bourgeois because middle-class circumstances 
are particularly amenable to the spirit of democracy. The bourgeoisie live 
in circumstances of moderate abundance: neither so poor as to be utterly 
dominated by circumstances or powerful persons, nor so well-off as to be 
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free from inter-dependence on the goodwill of other people for success. 
This is the sweet-spot of sufficient independence to think for oneself, and 
sufficient inter-dependence to be sensitive to the interests and concerns of 
other people; the conditions for the thriving of the civic habits and dispsi-
tions on which a democratic polity depends. 
A democratic society is organic, not a construct of high theory. Its heart is 
equality of political status, or what some would call ‘dignity’ - the free-
dom of all from domination, whether by government or other people. A 
real democracy must pass what the political philosopher Philip Pettit calls 
the 'eyeball test': is every person free to look any other in the eye, without 
fear and trembling? 
The brain of a democracy is its ability to make legitimate collective choices 
in a way that everyone finds acceptable even when they disagree with the 
conclusions. That sounds like an abstract adding machine - and the ter-
minology of social-choice theorists doesn't help. But actually it's about 
community and common sense. Democratic procedures for social choice 
work so long as everyone recognizes that we are all in this together, and 
that we have a shared interest in and commitment to making things bet-
ter for everyone even though we may disagree about how to do so. The 
members of a bourgeois society have an orientation toward co-operation, 
even with those we disagree with, because we are fixed in relations of in-
terdependence with each other and have no choice but to try to make this 
society work.  
So what's the problem with the rich? Their circumstances of life are dis-
tinctly different from the bourgeoisie. At the extreme, the combined as-
sets of Walmart's Walton family have been calculated to be equal to that 
of the bottom 150 million Americans combined. Great wealth changes 
people and their relationship to society as a whole. As Michael Sandel puts 
it, “Democracy does not require perfect equality, but it does require that 
citizens share in a common life.” (Sandel 2012, 205). 
The rich are independent of the rest of us. Obviously they are materially 
independent so long as their property rights remain recognized. They can 
achieve what they want by themselves, that is by buying it from others or 
paying someone else to do it for them. But this power of command also 
generates a social distance from society that allows them to become 'ethi-
cally independent'. Since they don't depend on the goodwill of others to 
succeed - for example, few of them have recognisable jobs - they may be-
come less concerned in general about whether they deserve goodwill. They 
are thereby freed from the disciplinary power of bourgeois social norms 
and standards, and, it often seems, even from the laws that apply to ordi-
nary people. I'm sure that sense of liberty must be quite exhilarating. But 
it also means that the rich aren't really like the rest of us.  
There is some worrying social psychology research about what the rich 
are like, suggesting that society’s nobility are not actually very noble (e.g., 
Piff et al. 2012). The rich appear to have a more positive attitude to greed 
than the rest of us, and this is expressed, for example, in feeling entitled to 
opt out of ethical standards - to lie and cheat when it suits them - and a 
lack of compassion toward others. Though recent events should teach us 
not to build castles on the findings of social psychology, such research 
chimes with what all of us see and hear every day of the self-centredness 
and self-servingness of the rich, from Donald Trump’s use of the US pres-
idential election to promote his business brand, to Warren Buffet’s exploi-
tation of his political connections to lobby for public subsidies of his in-
vestments in Goldman Sachs and railroads.4 The 'ethical independence' of 
the rich from the rest of society thus has political implications, since, to 
put it mildly, it does not suggest that the rule of the rich is to the benefit 
of all. 
For the rich the spirit of cooperation on which democracy depends is only 
an option, not a necessity. When the rich engage in politics they are not 
under the same constraints as the rest of us to find a mutually agreeable 
solution, since their fortunes are not fixed to the success of this society as 
ours are. They can always buy their way around the absence of public 
goods, or leave for somewhere nicer. 
That means that the rich don't have the same political interests as the rest 
of us (Page, Bartels, and Seawright 2013). They aren't worried about crime 
(their gated communities come with private security) or the quality of 
public education (their kids go to the fanciest schools money can buy) or 
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affordable accessible health care, pensions, job security, public parks, gas 
prices, environmental quality, or most of the other issues that the rest of 
us have no choice but to care about, and to care about politically since they 
are outside of our individual powers to fix. The political concerns of the 
rich do not lie in the provision of public goods, but in furthering their pri-
vate interests, whether their personal wealth and power or their political 
whimsies.5 That is why Adam Smith, the father of economics, warned us 
so vehemently in The Wealth of Nations to be suspicious of their self-serving 
rhetoric.6 
It is an unfortunately widespread fallacy that democracy is a means to 
achieve one's interests, rather than a space in which the public interest 
can be deliberated. Thus some people seem to believe that elections work 
in the same way as the rest of our modern consumer society: one orders 
what one wants at the election and then two weeks later it should arrive. 
Then, if it doesn't arrive, they think democracy must be broken. 
However, for the rich, politics actually does work somewhat like this, be-
cause they have the power to intervene non-democratically in our politics. 
They can and do use their wealth to command outsize political influence, 
in the ways I outlined above: bargaining and schmoozing privately with 
our politicians (Kalla and Broockman 2015); buying a media megaphone 
to transmit their opinions to voters and drown out counter-speech, and 
so on. The rich act this way because they believe that their opinion de-
serves to be heard because it is theirs, and their wealth means that it does 
indeed receive more attention. This is the logic of the market, of course, 
and it converts politics from a democratic forum into a market for influ-
ence. 
First, it introduces a principle of political inequality. The rich achieve ex-
traordinary influence over the character and direction of our society, and 
thus over how our individual lives will go, yet they have no qualification 
for that political role except their wealth. Like a feudal aristocracy, their 
special political status derives from a prior asymmetry of power combined 
with a personal sense of entitlement, rather than democratic selection. 
Second, it undermines the democratic legitimacy of our political institu-
tions, the perception that even if we don't personally agree with their 
outcomes they genuinely reflect the will of the people and we should go 
along with them. Every ideological faction wants to get their own way. 
Liberal democracy deals with the threat of factionalism not by suppression 
but by transforming it into a vibrant pluralism that is maintained by a 
transparently fair social-choice process. Everyone still thinks their own 
views are right and true and seeks to persuade others of them, but in a 
democracy everyone agrees that practical legitimacy derives from popular 
consent. Those ideas that win a democratic mandate have a prima facie le-
gitimacy to govern, subject to the checks and balances that protect oppos-
ing (minority) views. The rich are a particularly dangerous faction because 
of their ability to upset this principled modus vivendi by translating economic 
command into political influence greatly out of proportion to their num-
bers (cf Gilens and Page 2014).7  
Moreover, while as individuals they may have differing views about what 
society’s political priorities should be, ranging from converting the public 
education system to independent charter schools to defending Israel, they 
also have what may reasonably be called a class interest in the institutional 
arrangements that maintain their personal wealth, such as tax codes that 
favour income from capital over earned income. A democracy converts to 
a plutocracy gradually, as more and more of the business of politics is 
turned over to the rich: their interests, their values, their opinions, their 
policy proposals. Even though popular elections continue to be held, the 
link between political success and a democratic mandate to govern will 
crumble away. Political outcomes will no longer be understood as a reflec-
tion of the will of the people, but rather of the machinations of the rich or 
squabbles between them, as in modern plutocracies such as Ukraine and 
Moldova. As people come to realise that the system is rigged the legitima-
cy of the political regime will no longer rest on democratic grounds, but 
on some other grounds, such as economic prosperity or fear of even 
worse.   
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Why the Economy Doesn’t Need the Rich Either 
At this point I would like to address a common counter-argument to the 
claims I have been making. This is that there is a trade-off between democ-
racy and material prosperity: it is claimed that even if great concentrations 
of wealth undermine democratic ideals, this is a price that most people 
think is worth paying and thus has a certain democratic legitimacy in its 
own right. As I will show in a moment, this underestimates the threat the 
rich pose to capitalism as well as democracy. For now, let me focus on the 
specific assumption that capitalism requires the rich because they have 
more wealth than they need for their own consumption and so it is their 
investment of capital that makes the economy spin around and create 
jobs. That ‘job creator’ thesis is out of date and back to front.  
First, while in Adam Smith's time it might have been true that economic 
development required capitalists to reinvest their profits, this was because 
everyone else was too poor. But these days the economies of democratic 
societies are characterized – for now - by a broad middle-class whose sav-
ings are quite sufficient for funding business expansion and technological 
innovation, such as through the share-ownership of our pension funds or 
the bank loans backed by our deposits.  
Second, the greater the wealth inequality, the worse we may expect the 
economy to perform. A flourishing economy requires customers as well 
as investors. If the gains of economic productivity are overwhelmingly 
transferred to some small group (as profits) it means that they don't go to 
ordinary people (as wages) - (for example, since 1979 all the productivity 
gains of America's economy have gone to the richest 1%, median wages 
have been stagnant). The implications are, firstly, that the more unequal-
ly distributed economic growth is the less it increases national prosperity, 
because it does not increase the economic command of ordinary people to 
satisfy our wants (which was how Smith defined the wealth of nations). 
And, secondly, economic growth itself will be less than it would have been 
because high inequality limits the extent of the market (fewer customers) 
and thus the scope for innovation. 
But the biggest problem is the threat the capitalists themselves pose to a 
free and competitive market economy. As Thomas Piketty notes: “The 
entrepreneur inevitably tends to become a rentier ... capital reproduces 
itself faster than output increases. The past devours the future.” (Piketty 
2014, 571). This not only involves the production of economic inequalities 
that undermine democracy and the substitution of inheritance entitle-
ments for meritocracy, but also, as another economist, Joseph Stiglitz 
(2012) has argued with particular force and clarity, the outright corrup-
tion of democratic politics and capitalism itself. The winners of one round 
of market competition can readily translate their economic wealth into 
political influence and thereby change the rules to convert their income 
from a contingent market outcome into a guaranteed entitlement, for 
example by converting their businesses into quasi-monopolies 
that effectively levy a redistributive tax on society as a whole. The interest 
of the plutocratic elite is to widen the market but limit 
the competition; to do what Bill Gates did to Netscape and Carlos Slim did 
to Mexico's telecoms industry. Consider the re-construction of America’s 
financial services industry over the last 30 years. As the number of firms 
went down, favourable laws went up, converting the industry into a ren-
tier system in which the costs of financial services to the economy as a 
whole rose, profits rose, and risks were socialized. 
This rentier capitalism doesn't have the same virtues as the free market 
kind proposed by Smith and endorsed by most contemporary economists. 
It undermines the policing required to maintain real – free, fair and rival-
rous - competition. It misallocates the country's wealth and talent, 
by funnelling it away from productive enterprises and into rent-seeking 
enterprises that harvest the productivity of others. It politicises the econ-
omy in a way that undermines the conditions for liberal democracy ra-
ther than providing the shared prosperity that supports it.   
 
What To Do About the rich 
I have argued that the rich are a burden and a danger to our democratic 
society as a whole. But that fact doesn't tell us what to do about them. 
Some, such as Piketty, argue that we should tax the rich back into the 
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middle-class with progressive taxes on both their wealth and income. 
Such tax policies face great difficulty because imposing and then main-
taining them would require an overwhelming and sustained political con-
sensus to overcome the resistance of an extraordinarily powerful political 
constituency, exacerbated by opportunities for international tax competi-
tion and evasion. Piketty admits that his proposal for an international 
wealth tax of 5-10% on the greatest fortunes to unwind the inequality 
ratchet is “utopian”. My own proposal is more radical still, and yet may 
nevertheless be more effective than Piketty’s because it directly challenges 
the political domination of the class interests of the rich that would thwart 
his plan.  
Recall that I am not concerned here with fairness and social justice, but 
with the somewhat simpler but more urgent existential threat that the 
presence of the rich poses to a democratic society. I'm against the rich, but 
I don't care about their money. And that allows me to advance a different 
kind of proposal than one normally sees in this debate: the simple rule 
that no-one can be both a member of our democratic society and rich. 
A good way of thinking about what a democratic society is and should be, 
and how its members relate to it, is through the idea of the social con-
tract. A social contract is a hypothetical agreement to form a political as-
sociation for the mutual advantage, security, and justice of all its mem-
bers. The significance of this idea is that it allows us to scrutinize whether 
our current social arrangements resemble what we would have deliber-
ately chosen to create if we had had the chance, or whether we would 
have chosen something better – for instance, John Rawls' project in A 
Theory of Justice. In Rawls’ hands the social contract is a device for generat-
ing a unique agreement on the basic institutional arrangements of a just 
society by making explicit our intuitions about what a fair democratic so-
ciety requires.  
But one can also use the social contract device more crudely, to draw our 
attention to the preconditions for, and legitimate authority of, a demo-
cratic society. Though we may not follow Rawls’ controversial argument 
about what an ideally just democratic society would look like (as even 
Rawls himself accepted in his later work), we may all readily agree that 
some arrangements are incompatible with the persistence of any demo-
cratic society in which such questions of justice might be debated. Plutoc-
racy seems one of those, since it is incompatible with freedom from domi-
nation between citizens and political equality in social choice. 
The idea of the social contract also directs us to think of our democratic 
society as a kind of private club for the mutual benefit of its members. (In-
deed, this is how we often explicitly describe it when thinking about im-
migration). Such a club has the legitimate authority to enforce its consti-
tutional commitment to democracy and to take preventative action 
against members whose activities undermine it. 
Hence my modest proposal. We should first identify with some precision 
the category of what it seems reasonable to call ‘the rich’, i.e. those people 
whose capabilities for independence from and command over the rest of 
us crosses the threshold between enviable affluence and aristocratic privi-
lege. Then, when anyone in our society falls into the category of the prob-
lematic rich they would be offered a choice: give it away - hold a potlatch, 
give it to Oxfam, their favourite art museum foundation, it doesn’t matter 
what - or else cash out their winnings and depart the country, leaving 
their citizenship at the door on their way out. Since the rich are, well, 
rich, they will have all the means they need to make a new life for them-
selves elsewhere, and perhaps even inveigle their way into citizenship in a 
country that is less picky than we are. I'm sure they'll do just fine.8  
How much wealth makes someone problematically rich? That seems a 
political question for society to deliberate about, informed by empirical 
research from social scientists about the character and effects of large 
wealth inequalities. It is certainly not something for philosophers to de-
cide! But, for the sake of this discussion let me outline one approach, to 
show how such deliberation could move from broad and abstract princi-
ples to concrete proposals.  
The general principle is adapted from Rousseau’s proposal in The Social 
Contract that “in respect of riches, no citizen shall ever be wealthy enough 
to buy another, and none poor enough to be forced to sell himself” ([1762] 
2008, II.11). That suggests that the form of the definition of the rich should 
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be 'absolutely relative' rather than merely relative (i.e. we shouldn’t just 
target the richest 1%, because there will always be a richest 1%, and this 
proposal is not founded on envy of the better off). One way to go would 
be to use some multiple of the wealth of the median citizen (the person who 
is poorer than 50% of the population and richer than 50%) as a proxy for 
the distance from, and power over, ordinary citizens that defines prob-
lematic wealth. Let me suggest a very generous multiple of 500 to be going 
on with (surely everyone can agree that someone with more than 500 
times the wealth of the middling citizen is in a different class than the 
merely enviably affluent). What would that mean for a country like 
America? 
According to the Credit Suisse’s Global Wealth Report (2015) the median adult 
American’s personal wealth is around $50,000, which suggests a cut off of 
$25 million.9 For context, America’s mean average wealth is $350,000 (if the 
gulf between mean and median figures seems surprising, it reflects the fact 
that wealth inequality is much more pronounced than income inequali-
ty).10 For further context, median wealth in the UK is more than twice as 
high as America, suggesting a cut-off of $63 million. The UK-US compari-
son shows that this simple definition has a powerful inbuilt ratchet. The 
greater the concentration of wealth in a society, the greater, I have ar-
gued, the threat to democracy, and the lower the boundary line for the 
problematic rich that this definition will produce.  
There are obviously many technical difficulties remaining in this defini-
tion (from settling on appropriate accounting standards, to allowing for 
market volatility in asset values, to distinguishing individual from house-
hold wealth). But if it could be made to work, what would happen? Pre-
sumably there would be an outpouring of wealth as assets are liquidated 
and moved abroad. But the immediate consequences of this should not be 
exaggerated. The mansions and penthouse apartments would still be here, 
just owned by someone else. The already globalised financial portfolios 
(most of the assets of the rich) would merely be registered at a foreign ad-
dress and denominated in a different currency. A relatively small number 
of the rich own large stakes in national enterprises such as department-
store chains (those Waltons again), or TV stations, that might be difficult 
to unwind or internationalise.  
Aside from some short-term disruption the loss of the wealth of the rich 
would not make our society poorer. As I noted earlier, developed econo-
mies do not lack for capital; what the rich contribute to the economy is 
not investment but domination. An economy's wealth - as opposed to an 
individual's - relates to its efficiency in allocating its resources between 
competing projects so as to satisfy as many of the wants of its people as is 
technically possible. In the long term our economy's productivity would 
be higher without the distorting influence of the rich, and, not coinci-
dentally, the gains from that productivity would be more equally shared 
than they are now. 
But I don't think everyone would leave. After all, while tax avoidance is 
extremely popular among the rich, true tax exiles are somewhat rare. 
Democratic societies really are great places to live; plutocracies and autoc-
racies really aren't. (Even Russia’s oligarchs want to live in New York and 
London, and send their children to school there). I think that many rich 
people understand this, and would appreciate the benefits of democratic 
society even more if they were forced to make an explicit choice between 
continuing to live there or holding on to their money. 
Another possible consequence is a decline in innovation and entrepre-
neurship—vital to the future growth of the economy. If the rewards for 
winning 'the economic game' became truncated at a few million dollars, 
would people stop trying so hard? Will there be no future economic revo-
lutionaries like Bill Gates or Peter Thiel? 
This argument seems to rest on the assumption that innovators are only 
motivated by the possibility of vast financial rewards. On the one hand, 
this seems false because innovation is just what free people do in the face 
of interesting or important problems, whether that be in literature, com-
puter science, or logistics. On the other hand, it is true that many of 
those, like Bill Gates, who package up the technological breakthroughs of 
others into economically significant contributions are motivated by the 
hope of economic windfalls. And yet, how big does the reward have to be 
to motivate entrepreneurial innovation? Does it really have to be in the 
billions? Would no one write books anymore if they saw the wealth of (the 
British) JK Rowling capped at $63 million? Perhaps. Though I am sympa-
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thetic to Adam Smith’s argument that what people are really seeking is 
the “respect and admiration of mankind” and that a swimming pool full 
of money is merely one way – a vulgar, inferior way – of achieving that.11 
 
Conclusion 
My proposal, though quite serious, is obviously politically unfeasible in 
the face of the opposition of the rich. It is utopian. But utopian principles 
can nevertheless perform political service by introducing new normative 
benchmarks into political debate. (Consider the role that Nozickian liber-
tarianism performs in the politics of taxation). Like the idea of the social 
contract, the idea of exiling the rich is expected to do its work hypotheti-
cally, via persuading people to imagine ‘What if....?’. It politicises the issue of 
personal wealth in a new way - in terms of democratic citizenship - which 
may appeal to a different and perhaps larger and more ideologically mixed 
coalition of voters than alternative social-justice accounts such as egalitar-
ianism and libertarianism do. It thereby places a new onus upon the rich 
to justify their place amongst us, to overcome our suspicions by proving 
their loyalty to the democratic values of our society, for example by ac-
ceding to less radical proposals such as Piketty’s progressive tax on wealth, 
or at least much greater restrictions on the mechanisms, such as political 
donations, that translate private wealth into public influence.    
In this political perspective the very advantages of the rich are turned 
against them. The rich have been used to thinking of themselves as more 
equal than others in our society. Yet that power of command over others 
is exactly what puts the legitimacy of their place in our politics in ques-
tion. They have been used to enjoying their independence from the rest of 
us, hardly mixing with ordinary people and hardly noticing the national 
borders they cross. Yet this very feature would legitimate and justify 
our ostracising them in turn. To the extent that the rich believe all their 
accomplishments came through their own efforts and they don't need us 
for anything except property rights, we wouldn't be doing them any 
harm by exiling them from our politics, or even literally exiling them to 
another country. By achieving such independence, the rich have brought 
upon themselves the burden of justifying why they should be allowed to 
remain amongst us. If you don't need us, we can ask, why do we need you? 
 
Thomas Wells lectures in ethics and the philosophy of social science at the 
Institute for Philosophy at Leiden University, and at the University of Wit-
ten/Herdecke. 
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1 See Peter Campbell (2013) for a discussion of the provenance of this quotation. 
2 “The entitlement theory of justice in distribution is historical; whether a distribution is 
just depends upon how it came about”, Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford, UK, 1974, 
p. 153. 
3 India has surprised many political theorists by maintaining democratic political institu-
tions and ideals since independence (with one brief interlude in 1975-7). Yet the poverty 
of the overwhelming majority of India’s population translates into political powerless-
ness, an inability to make practical use of their theoretical democratic opportunities to 
address gross injustices. Hence the failure of India’s politics since independence to deal 
with problems like mass illiteracy and childhood malnourishment despite universal 
agreement about their importance. (See further, Drèze and Sen 2002 especially chapter 
10).  
4 According to reporting by Peter Schweizer (2012). 
5 Of course not all the rich are concerned with furthering their own material interests 
through politics, or with furthering an ideology which rationalises those material inter-
ests (such as ‘tax libertarians’). Many seem to want to address genuine public interest 
challenges that regular politics neglects. For example, the Gates Foundation’s support 
for education reform in general and charter schools in particular. Still, these may be 
called political whimsies to the extent that it is the rich themselves who take it upon 
themselves to determine and act upon what the public interest requires by making 
changes to our public institutions. Whether these experiments turn out well or badly, by 
deliberately bypassing democratic politics they undermine it.  
6 At one point Smith goes so far as to describe “those who live by profit” – i.e. capitalists - 
as “an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who 
have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who according-
ly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.” (Smith 1776, I.11.264).  
7 “The central point that emerges from our research is that economic elites and orga-
nized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on 
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U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little 
or no independent influence.” (Gilens and Page 2014, 565). Obviously, this is not an origi-
nal concern. See, among many others, Rawls’ critique of welfare state capitalism in Justice 
as Fairness (Rawls 2001, 137–8).  
8 And if they don’t think they would do just fine they are under no compulsion to leave. 
Their condition may be worse than before under this policy, but it remains greatly supe-
rior to their fellow non-rich citizens. The option set that includes a choice between hav-
ing one hundred million dollars in exile or retaining citizenship and only $25 million 
remains superior to that of their fellow citizens - many might volunteer to be in their 
place. It is also superior to the choice offered to the rich by a taxation policy, such as 
Piketty’s, that attempts to achieve the same goal more gradually: pay a substantial pro-
portion of your fortune to the government every year or go to jail. 
9 The reader should put no great faith in the precision of figures produced by a wealth 
management firm (cf. Piketty 2014, 437). I resort to them because there is still a dearth of 
rigorous statistics about wealth (rather than income), especially those that attempt to 
calculate the median individual’s assets rather than that of households.  
10 Indeed, many countries with relatively equal income distributions, such as Denmark 
and The Netherlands, exhibit surprisingly high wealth inequality.   
11 See Smith’s other great book, the Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), e.g., 1.3.29.  
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